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Abstract 
 
Pre-trial publicity regarding a pending criminal case, which publicity may be in the 
form of media coverage of the case or a prior decision given in parallel judicial 
proceedings arising from substantially the same facts as the criminal matter, may 
be adverse to an accused. Such media publicity or findings contained in the parallel 
judicial decision may implicate the accused in the commission of the crime on which 
he or she is to stand trial. The publicity may, for example, suggest that the accused 
is "guilty" of the crime charged, or that the accused is of bad character having had 
the propensity to commit the crime. Conversely, pre-trial publicity may portray the 
accused as innocent of any criminal wrongdoing. In other words, pre-trial publicity 
may prejudge the issues that are to be adjudicated on at trial. A central question 
that may arise in these instances is whether there is a real and substantial risk that 
such publicity would materially affect or prejudice the impartial adjudication of the 
criminal case; that is to say, whether the publicity is likely to have a biasing effect 
on the trial court in the adjudication process or the outcome of the trial, thereby 
imperilling the constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Another key consideration, in respect of which there is scant literature and case-
law, is the question of the impact which adverse pre-trial publicity may have on the 
prosecutor in instituting and conducting a prosecution. Being unduly influenced by 
such publicity, a prosecutor may impinge upon the accused's right to a fair trial. 
There is also a dearth of authority on how the prosecutor is to function in the face 
of pre-trial publicity which may be prejudicial to the accused. This article seeks to 
explore these aspects vis-à-vis the prosecutor. It is posited that in an adversarial 
criminal justice system the same level of impartiality required of the presiding 
judicial officer is not required of the prosecutor, and that prosecutorial bias towards 
the guilt of an accused is inevitable where the prosecutor decides to institute a 
prosecution after studying the police case docket. Thus, exposure of the prosecutor 
to virulent pre-trial publicity would not be inimical to the fair disposition of the 
accused's trial provided that the prosecutor conducts the trial fairly and without 
undue prejudice to the accused and is dedicated to assisting the court in arriving at 
the truth. Moreover, additional knowledge and understanding of a case which a 
prosecutor gains from an extraneous source does not amount to bias or prejudice. 
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When a public prosecutor is convinced of the guilt of 
an accused, the case should be prosecuted with 
energy and skill but with propriety and fairness.1 
1 Introduction 
Pre-trial reporting on crime in South Africa, as is the case globally, is an 
accepted and common phenomenon or practice, but it can give rise to a 
tension between the right to freedom of expression, more particularly the right 
to a free press and other media, enshrined in section 16 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) and the right 
to a fair trial guaranteed in section 35(3) of the Constitution.2 Publicity 
surrounding a criminal case that is sub judice (still pending) may be in the 
form of media reports, statements or comments, or in the form of published 
findings or pronouncements made in parallel judicial proceedings arising from 
substantially the same facts as the pending criminal matter. Such publicity 
may be adverse to an accused: it may indicate or suggest that the accused 
is "guilty" of the crime with which he or she has been charged, or it may 
suggest that the accused is of bad character, so much so that the accused 
had the propensity to commit the crime in question. Media coverage in 
advance of trial may conversely portray the accused as innocent of the crime 
with which he or she has been charged.3 Such publicity, then, may prejudge 
the issues of the case at bar. 
The central question that may arise in the above circumstances is whether 
there is a real and substantial risk that pre-trial publicity would materially 
affect or undermine the impartial adjudication of the accused's case or have 
a biasing effect on the outcome of his or her trial, thereby imperilling the right 
 
* DWM Broughton. BIur LLB (Unisa) LLD (UP). Advocate of the High Court of South 
Africa; Senior State Advocate, National Prosecuting Authority. Email: 
dbroughton@npa.gov.za / david.broughton@icloud.com. This article is based on the 
author's doctoral thesis entitled An Analysis of Pre-trial Publicity and the Accused's 
Right to a Fair Trial: A Deconstruction of the Krion Case (University of Pretoria 2019). 
1 Jennings v United States 364 F 2d 513 (1966) 516 paras 6, 7. 
2 See, for example, Broughton 2019a THRHR 213-214; Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-
TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 2 SACR 493 (SCA) 
(hereafter the Midi Television case); Brown v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
2012 1 All SA 61 (WCC) (hereafter the Brown case); Pelser v Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2009 2 SACR 25 (T) (hereafter the Pelser case); Banana v Attorney-
General 1999 1 BCLR 27 (ZS) (hereafter the Banana case); Snyman Criminal Law 
320-322; Hill 2001 SAJHR 563; Stevenson 2007 Obiter 614; Paizes "Conduct of 
Proceedings" 22-42B; Van Rooyen 2014 HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological 
Studies 1-9; Swanepoel 2006 Ecquid Novi 3. 
3 Broughton 2019a THRHR 214-217. 
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to a fair trial.4 Such a question may arise even in the context of South Africa's 
criminal justice system, where a trial is not adjudicated on by a jury, but by a 
trained judicial officer (either a judge or magistrate depending on the forum 
in which the trial is heard) sitting alone or with assessors.5 
Very little attention has been given in the case-law and literature to the 
question of the impact which adverse pre-trial publicity may have on the 
prosecutor in instituting and conducting a prosecution. A prosecutor being 
unduly influenced by such publicity may impinge upon the accused's right to 
a fair trial. There is also a dearth of authority on how the prosecutor is to 
function in the face of pre-trial publicity which is prejudicial to the accused. 
This article seeks to answer these questions. In exploring the said aspects, 
the article examines the core functions and duties of the prosecutor in 
exercising the prosecutorial discretion to institute a prosecution or decline to 
prosecute, the core functions and duties of the prosecutor in handling a 
prosecution in court, and the question of what would be required of the 
prosecutor when a criminal case generates extensive pre-trial publicity that 
is detrimental to the accused or prejudges the issues that are to be 
adjudicated on at trial. The article commences by outlining the underlying 
fundamental or pivotal role which the prosecutor plays in the criminal justice 
system. 
It is posited in this paper that in an adversarial (accusatorial) system, the 
same level of impartiality required of the presiding judicial officer is not 
required of the prosecutor in handling a criminal trial, and that the court is the 
arbiter and ultimate repository of the fairness of the trial proceedings. It is 
posited, moreover, that where the prosecutor decides to prosecute it is 
inevitable that he or she would entertain a mental inclination or predisposition 
or bias towards the guilt of the accused, having studied the police case 
docket. The prosecutor will be partisan at trial and will be perceived by the 
accused as being biased. Thus, exposure of the prosecutor to surrounding 
hostile publicity in advance of trial would not be inimical to the fair disposition 
of the accused's trial, provided that the prosecutor conducts the trial fairly and 
without undue prejudice to the accused and is dedicated to assisting the court 
in arriving at the truth. Moreover, additional knowledge and understanding of 
a case which a prosecutor gains from an extraneous source does not amount 
to bias or prejudice. 
 
4 The Banana case 34E-I; Broughton 2019a THRHR 217. Also compare the Midi 
Television case para 19, in relation to the question of the test for sub judice contempt. 
5 Broughton 2019a THRHR 213 et seq. For a leading Southern African decision on the 
matter, see the Banana case. Also see the Pelser case; the Brown case. 
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2 The pivotal role of the prosecutor in an adversarial 
criminal justice system 
Prosecutors play a critical role in the criminal justice system. In S v 
Tshotshoza (hereafter the Tshotshoza case) it was noted that the 
Constitution acknowledges that there is crime and that criminals are to be 
prosecuted and punished, and that for this purpose there has to be a 
prosecuting authority which has to take the necessary initiative in the 
institution of prosecutions and the fulfilment of all necessary steps incidental 
thereto.6 Prosecutors have a constitutional mandate to prosecute crime.7 
In essence, the South African criminal trial is an adversarial proceeding which 
is characterised by a contest between the prosecution, for the State, and the 
accused (or defence), over which an impartial judicial officer is to preside and 
keep the scales even.8 The parties to a criminal trial are the prosecutor and 
the accused.9 The prosecutor conducts the case "for one of the two sides in 
a trial, namely the state, as representing the citizenry."10 It is the function of 
the prosecutor "to place before a court what the prosecution considers to be 
credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime."11 "The prosecutor 
must provide, independent of the accused, proof of any accusation made."12 
This is in line not only with the accused's constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent,13 but also with the adversarial system, which is party-driven, in 
terms whereof each party conducts his or her own investigation and in a 
partisan way builds a case.14 The prosecutor is moreover dominus litis (i.e. in 
control of the prosecution or "master of the suit"), and thus "[t]he presiding 
officer must always resist the temptation to descend into the arena to a point 
where he/she coaches or advises the public prosecutor on how to conduct 
his/her case."15 As dominus litis, the prosecutor "has a discretion regarding 
 
6 S v Tshotshoza 2010 2 SACR 274 (GNP) para 18. 
7 S v Basson 2004 1 SACR 285 (CC) paras 32-33; S v Basson 2007 1 SACR 566 (CC) 
para 144, with reference to s 179(2) of the Constitution. 
8 S v Mamabolo (E TV intervening) 2001 1 SACR 686 (CC) para 55; Wolf 2011 TSAR 
712. See also S v Rudman; S v Mthwana 1992 1 SA 343 (A) 348F: "The essential 
characteristic of the adversary system is that the presiding judicial officer appears as 
an impartial arbiter between the parties." 
9 Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 22-1. 
10 Porritt v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2015 1 SACR 533 (SCA) para 13 
(hereafter the Porritt case). 
11 The Porritt case para 11. Also see Van Breda v Media 24 Ltd 2017 2 SACR 491 (SCA) 
para 50 (hereafter the Van Breda case). 
12 Steytler 2001 LDD 3. 
13 S v Lavhengwa 1996 2 SACR 453 (W) 485c-e. 
14 Steytler 2001 LDD 3. 
15 S v Moshoeu 2007 1 SACR 38 (T) 41e. Also see S v Matthys 1999 1 SACR 117 (C) 
119e-f. 
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prosecution and pre-trial procedures. For instance, the state may decide inter 
alia whether or not to institute a prosecution; on what charges to prosecute; 
in which court or forum to prosecute; when to withdraw charges, and so 
forth."16 As dominus litis, the prosecutor is also "the party who dictates the 
route a case will take towards being finalised."17 
In South Africa's criminal justice system prosecutors serve as the 
gatekeepers of the system. Not only do they evaluate the conduct of the 
police and the strength of the state's case, but they also actively present the 
case to the court and represent the interests of society throughout the 
proceedings.18 "The role of the prosecutor comes with great responsibility as 
he is vested with the power to charge and try accused. [Prosecutors] must 
seek justice, do justice, protect the innocent and charge the guilty."19 In other 
common-law jurisdictions the prosecutor similarly "plays his most important 
role as the gatekeeper of the criminal courts and as advocate of the state in 
criminal trials."20 Prosecutors are gatekeepers of the criminal justice system 
because without their intervention judicial sanctions cannot occur.21 The 
effects of the work of the prosecutor reverberate through every component of 
the criminal justice system: the police, the judiciary and correctional 
services.22 It follows that the integrity of the system is largely dependent on 
the integrity of the prosecutor.23 Few public officials can so affect the lives of 
others as can prosecutors.24 Prosecutorial decisions to prosecute or not to 
prosecute clearly "affect accused persons and their families, victims, 
witnesses, law enforcement agencies and the public."25 The prosecutor 
possesses the greatest power to take away the freedom of a person.26 The 
discretionary power exercised by the prosecutor "in initiation, accusation, and 
discontinuance of prosecution gives him more control over an individual's 
liberty and reputation than any other public official."27 The United States 
Supreme Court has held in this respect that:28 
 
16 S v Sehoole 2015 2 SACR 196 (SCA) para 10. 
17 S v Khalema and Five Similar Cases 2008 1 SACR 165 (C) para 22. 
18 S v Sithole 2012 1 SACR 586 (KZD) para 7. Also see De Villiers 2011 THRHR 256. 
19 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 256. 
20 Felkenes 1975 Sw U L Rev 98. 
21 Mokoena 2012 Stell L Rev 300. 
22 Felkenes 1975 Sw U L Rev 98. 
23 Felkenes 1975 Sw U L Rev 98. 
24 Reiss 1987 U Pa L Rev 1365. 
25 Du Toit 2015 SACJ 85. 
26 Gershman 2001 Geo J Legal Ethics 311. 
27 Note 1955 U Pa L Rev 1057. 
28 Young v United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils SA 481 US 787 (1987) 814 (hereafter the 
Young case). 
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Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation 
stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full 
machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant 
is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and 
adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. 
A former prosecutor in the United States of America, Kenneth Melilli,29 
observes as follows: 
No government official can effect a greater influence over a citizen than the 
prosecutor who charges that citizen with a crime. In many cases, the prosecutor 
determines the fate of those accused, at least in those cases where the 
evidence or statutory sentencing structure renders the ultimate outcome of the 
prosecution largely a foregone conclusion. 
Melilli30 explains that even when a criminal charge does not result in a 
conviction, the mere filing of the charge can have a devastating effect on an 
individual's life, including potential pre-trial detention, loss of employment, 
embarrassment and loss of reputation, the financial cost of a criminal 
defence, and the emotional stress and anxiety attendant upon awaiting the 
finalisation of the case. According to Melilli,31 "[s]uch consequences may well 
have a permanent effect that is not cured even by an acquittal at trial." Melilli32 
expresses the opinion therefore that prosecutors, as many do, should "regard 
the possibility of charging an innocent person as 'the single most frightening 
aspect of the prosecutor's job'." Yutar33 likewise indicates that a decision to 
prosecute should not be made lightly "because once you institute a 
prosecution against a person, even though he may subsequently be 
acquitted, you have done that person irreparable harm." Given the above 
role, and indeed the far-reaching power, which prosecutors have in the 
criminal justice system, the utmost in integrity, propriety and competence is 
required of them; they must adhere to the highest ethical and professional 
standards. 
3 Exercising the prosecutorial discretion to institute a 
prosecution or to decline to prosecute (the charging 
discretion) 
 
29 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 671 (footnotes omitted). 
30 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 671-672. See similarly, Mahupelo v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2017 1 NR 275 (HC) para 132 (hereafter the Mahupelo case). 
31 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 672. 
32 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 672. 
33 Yutar 1977 SACC 136. 
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A core responsibility of a prosecutor is making decisions to prosecute or not 
to prosecute.34 Indeed, the first most important function that must be carried 
out by a prosecutor is the decision to charge a person with a crime.35 Such a 
decision would have "extensive and pervasive consequences for all 
concerned."36 The public must therefore have the assurance that those who 
wield this power will be guided by their sense of public responsibility for the 
attainment of justice.37 A wrong decision to prosecute or, conversely, a wrong 
decision not to prosecute, would both tend to undermine the confidence of 
the community in the criminal justice system.38 
With respect to the decision to prosecute or not, the law, as already alluded 
to, gives prosecutors a discretion; indeed, discretionary power is inherent in 
the office of the prosecutor.39 South Africa does not have a system of 
compulsory prosecution.40 Prosecutorial discretion should "be exercised 
fairly, intelligently, and in accordance with what is required at each stage of 
the criminal justice process."41 The discretion which prosecutors have is "a 
very valuable safeguard", because one has to take into account when 
deciding whether to prosecute someone what the consequences to him or 
her may be, apart from any penalty which a court of law might inflict.42 
Mokoena43 points out that "the manner and the process through which 
prosecutorial discretion is exercised are central to the quality of the criminal 
justice system." Mokoena44 observes further that "prosecutorial discretion 
forms the cornerstone of prosecutorial independence", adding that: 
To this end, prosecutorial discretion has been described as an 'essential 
feature' of the criminal justice system. Such discretion is required, as a matter 
of course, in order to insulate the prosecutor from political interference, and to 
promote impartiality and independence. 
Prosecutors in South Africa, as with prosecuting authorities in other Anglo-
American jurisdictions, "enjoy a virtually unfettered discretion as to whether 
a person suspected of criminal conduct should be prosecuted or not, and if 
 
34 The Mahupelo case para 132; Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-49. 
35 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 671. 
36 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-49. 
37 The Young case 814. 
38 The Mahupelo case para 132. 
39 Yutar 1977 SACC 136; Gourlie 1982 Man LJ 37. 
40 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-49. 
41 Visser, Oosthuizen and Verschoor 2014 SALJ 880. 
42 Yutar 1977 SACC 136. 
43 Mokoena 2012 Stell L Rev 301. 
44 Mokoena 2012 Stell L Rev 301 (footnote omitted). 
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prosecuted, with which offences and before which court";45 "[t]he discretion 
to prosecute is a wide one".46 It is submitted that this breadth of the 
prosecutor's discretion is underpinned or reinforced by the fact that, as the 
Constitutional Court has affirmed, "the prosecution of crime is a matter of 
importance to the State", which flows from the State's power to institute 
criminal proceedings in terms of section 179(2) of the Constitution, and the 
fact that the Constitution, by providing for an independent prosecuting 
authority able to exercise such power on behalf of the State "makes it plain 
that [the] effective prosecution of crime is an important constitutional 
objective."47 There is a constitutional obligation on the State to prosecute 
crime; prosecuting those accused of offences which threaten or infringe the 
rights of citizens "is of central importance in our constitutional framework."48 
However, a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute may be subject to 
judicial review and set aside where the prosecutor's discretion is exercised 
improperly or the decision is illegal and irrational or is mala fides or deployed 
for ulterior purposes - in other words, where the discretion is in breach of the 
principle of legality. The constitutional principle of legality requires that a 
decision-maker must exercise the powers conferred on him or her lawfully, 
rationally and in good faith. Rationality is a minimum requirement applicable 
to the exercise of all public power. Decisions by a public authority must be 
rationally connected to the purpose for which the power is given, otherwise 
they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement.49 
Nonetheless, while decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are not 
 
45 Richings 1977 SACC 143. Also see, for example, S v Yengeni 2006 1 SACR 405 (T) 
para 52 (hereafter the Yengeni case), finding that the "untrammelled exercise" of the 
prosecutor's powers "in a spirit of professional independence is vital to the functioning 
of the legal system." 
46 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-49. 
47 S v Basson 2007 1 SACR 566 (CC) para 144. Also see S v Basson 2004 1 SACR 285 
(CC) paras 32-33; S v Coetzee 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC) para 13; Investigating 
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 2 SACR 349 (CC) para 53; S v 
Thebus 2003 2 SACR 319 (CC) para 40. Having special regard to the rights of victims, 
"it would be unconstitutional if the prosecuting authority would refuse to prosecute 
'where there is a strong case and adequate evidence to do so'" - Wolf 2011 TSAR 
713, citing Nkadimeng v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 ZAGPHC 422 
(12 December 2008) para 15.4.4. 
48 S v Basson 2004 1 SACR 285 (CC) paras 32-33. 
49 See in this regard, Booysen v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 2 
SACR 556 (KZD); Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
2014 1 SA 254 (GNP); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 
2014 4 SA 298 (SCA); Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2016 2 SACR 1 (GP); Zuma v Democratic Alliance 2018 1 SA 200 
(SCA); Minister of Police v Du Plessis 2014 1 SACR 217 (SCA) para 31; Freedom 
Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2018 1 SACR 436 (GP). 
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immune from judicial review, the power to review is one to be sparingly 
exercised in order to safeguard the independence of the prosecuting authority 
and given the great width of the prosecutor's discretion and the polycentric 
character that generally accompanies its decision-making, including 
considerations of public interest and policy.50 In principle, a court cannot 
interfere with a bona fide decision of the prosecutor.51 
Critically, as with all other powers, functions and duties of the prosecuting 
authority, the prosecutor's charging discretion must be exercised 
independently and impartially; that is, without fear, favour or prejudice.52 This 
is in terms of the Constitution,53 the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 
1998 (hereafter the NPA Act),54 the Code of Conduct for Members of the 
National Prosecuting Authority (hereafter the Code of Conduct for Members 
of the NPA),55 and the Prosecution Policy of the NPA (hereafter the 
Prosecution Policy).56 The prosecutor's discretion is also subject only to the 
Constitution and the law.57 De Villiers58 writes in this regard: 
 
50 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 4 SA 298 (SCA) 
paras 25-26. Also see Du Toit 2015 SACJ 90. 
51 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-40B-1-40C; De Villiers 2011 THRHR 257; 
Mohan v Director of Public Prosecutions, Kwazulu-Natal 2017 2 SACR 76 (KZD) para 
42; General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba 2017 1 SACR 47 (GP) para 43. 
52 See, for example, National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 2016 1 SACR 308 (SCA) para 24; Beinart 
1962 Acta Juridica 123, noting that the decision to institute criminal prosecutions 
should "be in the hands of an impartial person who will judge independently of the 
executive and of the police whether a prosecution should be instituted – a person, who 
is under a duty to enforce the criminal law against all offenders and who will act in a 
quasi-judicial way, that is to say in a just and proper manner." 
53 Section 179(4) of the Constitution. 
54 Sections 32(1)(a) and (b) and (2) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 
(the NPA Act). 
55 Framed in terms of s 22(6) of the NPA Act and published in GN R1257 in GG 33907 
of 29 December 2010 (the Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA), and contained 
in "National Prosecuting Authority" Prosecuting-53-Prosecuting-56 – see specifically 
paragraphs A(d), B and C. 
56 Revision date: June 2013. Contained in "National Prosecuting Authority" Prosecuting-
41-Prosecuting-51 – see specifically Parts 1 and 3. In National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2016 1 SACR 308 (SCA) para 24, it was pointed out that in making a decision to 
prosecute or not to prosecute, such a decision must not only be taken by a prosecutor 
impartially, without fear, favour or prejudice, but the prosecutor must also "adhere to 
prosecuting policy and policy directives", the aim of which axiomatically "must be to 
serve the interests of justice for the benefit of the public in general." Although this 
decision was overturned in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2017 1 SACR 284 (CC), this does 
not affect the validity of the above finding in relation to the prosecution policy – see Du 
Toit 2017 SACJ 93-94. 
57 Section 32(1)(a) of the NPA Act; De Villiers 2011 THRHR 252. 
58 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 263. 
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What is then the best constitutional structure within which to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion? The manner in which decisions to prosecute or not are 
reached is crucial to the criminal justice system. This requires that the manner 
in reaching such decisions must be impartial and fair. Prosecutorial decisions 
should only be made with due attention to the requirements of the law, while not 
forgetting the public interest implications of legal decisions. 
In S v Van der Westhuizen (hereafter the Van der Westhuizen case), the 
Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the concept of prosecutorial 
impartiality, as it is understood under South African law and in terms of 
international instruments,59 does not mean that the prosecutor may not act 
adversarially, but it denotes "acting even-handedly, i.e. avoiding 
discrimination; and the duty to act impartially is therefore part of the more 
general duty to act without fear, favour or prejudice."60 
Prosecutors must carry out their functions impartially and avoid all political, 
social, religious, racial, cultural, sexual or any other kind of discrimination.61 
For present purposes, it is important to highlight that prosecutorial impartiality 
also means that prosecutors in performing their duties must act with 
objectivity and remain unaffected by individual or sectional interests and 
public or media pressures. Prosecutors may take into account the public 
interest, but this is distinct from media or partisan interests and concerns, 
however vociferously these may be presented.62 
Prosecutorial independence demands that no organ of state and no member 
or employee of an organ of state nor any other person shall improperly 
interfere with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any member 
thereof in the exercise, carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, 
 
59 See s 179(4) of the Constitution; s 32 of the NPA Act; Code of Conduct for Members 
of the NPA; United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990) (hereafter 
the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors); Standards of Professional 
Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors (1999) 
(hereafter the IAP Standards of Professional Responsibility). In framing the Code of 
Conduct for Members of the NPA, due account was taken inter alia of the UN 
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and the IAP Standards of Professional 
Responsibility. Moreover, s 22(4)(f) of the NPA Act requires the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions to bring the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors to the 
attention of directors and prosecutors working for the NPA and to promote their respect 
for and compliance with the principles contained therein (see De Villiers 2011 THRHR 
252). 
60 S v Van der Westhuizen 2011 2 SACR 26 (SCA) para 9. 
61 The Porritt case para 12, with reference to s 13(a) of the UN Guidelines on the Role 
of Prosecutors. 
62 Paragraph C(c) and (f) of the Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA; ss 3(b) and 
(c) of the IAP Standards of Professional Responsibility; s 13(b) of the UN Guidelines 
on the Role of Prosecutors. 
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duties and functions.63 The prosecutorial discretion should be free from 
political, public and judicial interference.64 Prosecutors should be protected 
against arbitrary action by the government and should be able to perform 
their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, 
improper interference or unjustified exposure to civil, penal or other liability.65 
The independence of members of the NPA is protected in terms of both the 
Constitution66 and the provisions of the NPA Act.67 Prosecutors, moreover, 
have always owed a duty to carry out their public functions independently and 
in the interests of the public.68 The Constitution guarantees the professional 
independence of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (hereafter the 
NDPP) and every professional member of his or her staff, with the obvious 
aim of ensuring their freedom from any interference in their functions by the 
powerful, the well-connected, the rich and the peddlers of political influence.69 
"Prosecuting independence primarily denotes independence from political 
influence of the justice minister and the executive branch."70 The Constitution 
and the NPA Act "direct all branches of government, and in particular the 
executive, to respect the domain of the prosecuting authority, and not to 
interfere in its decisions. For this reason, an accused has a constitutional right 
to a prosecutor that is independent from political influence."71 The 
prosecutorial discretion must not be subject to the authority of the 
 
63 Section 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act; De Villiers 2011 THRHR 252, 259. 
64 Paragraph B of the Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA; s 2 of the IAP Standards 
of Professional Responsibility. 
65 Section 4 of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors; s 6 of the IAP Standards 
of Professional Responsibility; De Villiers 2011 THRHR 252, 257. 
66 Section 179(4) of the Constitution; S v Basson 2004 1 SACR 285 (CC) para 33; De 
Villiers 2011 THRHR 258. Also see Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 146, where the Constitutional Court observed that s 179(4) 
of the Constitution provides that "national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting 
authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice", and that "[t]here is 
accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or 
executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by 
the courts." 
67 Section 32 of the NPA Act. See Nkabinde v Judicial Service Commission 2016 4 SA 
1 (SCA) para 92 (hereafter the Nkabinde case); the Yengeni case paras 48-52. In S v 
Tshilidzi 2013 JDR 1356 (SCA) para 8, it was affirmed that s 32 of the NPA Act gives 
effect to s 179 of the Constitution, which entrenches the independence of the 
prosecuting authority. 
68 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2002 1 SACR 79 (CC) para 72 (hereafter the Carmichele case). Self-
evidently, it would ordinarily be in the public interest that crime be prosecuted, and 
indeed, conscientiously and vigorously so. 
69 The Yengeni case para 51. 
70 Wolf 2011 TSAR 727. 
71 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 248. 
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government.72 The Supreme Court of Appeal has rejected the notion that a 
prosecutor is to be regarded as part of the executive; the NPA falls under 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution, dealing with "Courts and Administration of 
Justice".73 The executive cannot instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline 
to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution.74 The prosecuting 
authority has absolute authority over these critical decisions; no person or 
entity can force the prosecuting authority to prosecute or to terminate a 
prosecution.75 So crucial is the independence of the prosecuting authority 
that any person who infringes on such independence in contravention of 
section 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or 
to both such fine and such imprisonment.76 
Moreover, in line with the doctrine of the separation of powers, it is also not 
competent for a court to issue a mandatory interdict to compel a 
prosecution.77 Exercising the prosecutorial discretion to institute a 
prosecution or to decline to prosecute lies exclusively in the domain of the 
prosecuting authority, whose constitutional mandate it is to prosecute 
crime.78 
For present purposes, the question arises what the constitutional imperatives 
of prosecutorial independence and impartiality mean in the making of a 
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute in the context of pre-trial publicity. 
Firstly, the prosecutor cannot become, as it were, an extension of the media. 
The prosecutor must act independently of the media. That is to say, he or she 
must not base his or her decision on media reports or opinions or sentiments 
expressed in the media, nor in exercising his or her discretion may he or she 
yield to or be influenced by pressure placed on the prosecuting authority by 
the media or the public as expressed through the media. Besides political 
and judicial interference, the prosecutorial discretion to institute and stop 
 
72 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 256. 
73 The Nkabinde case para 88. 
74 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 1 SACR 361 (SCA) para 32. 
Also see Wolf 2017 PER / PELJ 9-10 n 35, noting that the executive cannot give orders 
to prosecutors. 
75 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 262. 
76 See s 41(1) of the NPA Act. 
77 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 4 SA 298 (SCA) 
para 51. 
78 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 4 SA 298 (SCA) 
para 51. 
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criminal proceedings must also be free from "public" interference.79 
Surrounding publicity may result in a prosecutor being reluctant to withdraw 
a case notwithstanding that he or she has personal doubts concerning the 
guilt of the accused, because by doing so he or she runs the risk of being 
perceived in the public domain as soft, fearful and lacking the skills to win the 
difficult case.80 Where a case generates media attention, there may be 
"enhanced pressure" upon the prosecutor to obtain a conviction.81 A 
prosecutor may prefer a particular charge or a more serious charge against 
an accused which is not supported by the prima facie evidence as per the 
case docket, where he or she is driven by a media frenzy attendant upon the 
case (because of its high-profile or notorious nature or because it involves 
shocking facts) or by an outcry from society (or community outrage) as 
expressed through the media in its various forms, including social media, 
especially as to what the outcome of the case ought to be. The prosecutor 
may thereby hope to obtain a conviction which is not supported by the 
evidence and to gain an increased or a more severe sentence than what the 
facts of the case warrant and thus to be seen in the media as a champion of 
"justice" who satisfied the public's baying for justice and the maximum or 
harshest possible punishment (i.e. who did what the public expected). The 
prosecutor may simply lose his or her objectivity on account of hostile or 
adverse pre-trial publicity when exercising his or her discretion, instead of 
devoting himself or herself to the facts of the case. 
Prosecutors should bring professional standards of a non-partisan nature to 
their prosecutorial discretion.82 The decision to prosecute or not to prosecute 
must be shaped in substance by an impartial and objective assessment of 
the prima facie evidence as contained in the case docket, the law and the 
public interest, as well as prosecutorial guidelines, codes of conduct and 
policy directives. Prosecutors must assess whether there is sufficient and 
admissible evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful 
prosecution. There must indeed be a reasonable prospect of a conviction, 
otherwise a prosecution should not be commenced or continued.83 Before a 
prosecution is initiated, there should be reasonable and probable cause to 
believe that the accused is guilty of an offence.84 When instituting or 
maintaining criminal proceedings, the prosecutor should proceed only when 
 
79 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2016 2 SACR 494 
(WCC) para 24; Paragraph B of the Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA 
(emphasis added). 
80 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 688. 
81 Melilli 1992 BYU L Rev 688. 
82 De Villiers 2011 THRHR 256. 
83 Part 3.A of the Prosecution Policy. Also see Du Toit 2017 SACJ 94. 
84 The Mahupelo case para 136; S v Lubaxa 2001 2 SACR 703 (SCA) para 19. 
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a case is well founded, upon evidence reasonably believed to be reliable and 
admissible.85 It is clear that prosecutors must pay meticulous attention to 
police dockets before deciding whether or not to prosecute,86 and in this 
respect they must act with objectivity.87 A "sensible discretion"88 and 
"circumspection"89 should be exercised by the prosecutor in deciding whether 
to institute a prosecution. After all, ''it is excellent to have a giant's strength, 
but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant."90 A prosecutor should be just a 
prosecutor, not a persecutor. As a public official and in giving effect to the 
aspect of prosecutorial accountability, decisions taken by the prosecutor 
should not be arbitrary. Prosecutors in their decisions should be responsible 
before the law and act within the confines of legality. "The rule of law requires 
that all those who exercise public power must do so in accordance with the 
law and the Constitution."91 Openness and transparency are also required in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.92 
4 The adversarial prosecutor at trial in the face of adverse 
pre-trial or surrounding publicity 
Once a decision has been made to prosecute, the prosecutor in taking the 
matter to court may act adversarially,93 and he or she would seek the interests 
of the State and primarily aim at obtaining a conviction.94 A prosecutor should 
seek to obtain the conviction of the guilty;95 "[a] criminal trial follows a well-
established order, with the prosecutor in a criminal case trying to establish, 
through the presentation of evidence, the guilt of the accused beyond a 
 
85 The Mahupelo case para 136; para D(d) of the Code of Conduct for Members of the 
NPA. 
86 Du Toit 2015 SACJ 87. 
87 Minister of Police v Du Plessis 2014 1 SACR 217 (SCA) para 34. 
88 S v Macrae 2014 2 SACR 215 (SCA) para 30. See also Du Toit 2015 SACJ 85. 
89 Richings 1977 SACC 146. 
90 Richings 1977 SACC 146. 
91 Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 1 SACR 213 (CC) para 70. 
92 Mokoena 2012 Stell L Rev 303. 
93 The Van der Westhuizen case para 9. 
94 Cole 2010 SACJ 333; the Van Breda case para 50. 
95 See, for example, the Van der Westhuizen case para 11; the Porritt case para 13; S v 
Prinsloo 2016 2 SACR 25 (SCA) paras 181-182 (hereafter the Prinsloo case); 
Swanepoel 2012 SACJ 120-123; Zacharias 1991 Vand L Rev 51; Damaška 1973 U 
Pa L Rev 563; Civiletti 1979 NY L Sch L Rev 1; Felkenes 1975 Sw U L Rev 110; 
People v Vasquez 137 P 3d 199 (2006) 211: "Zealous advocacy in pursuit of 
convictions forms an essential part of the prosecutor's proper duties and does not 
show the prosecutor's participation was improper"; Randall v The Queen 2002 1 WLR 
2237 para 10 (Westlaw), per Lord Bingham (as cited with approval in the Van der 
Westhuizen case para 11), where it was pointed out that the adversarial format of the 
criminal trial is directed to ensuring a fair opportunity for the prosecution to establish 
guilt and a fair opportunity for the accused to advance his or her defence. 
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reasonable doubt."96 The prosecutor in the adversary model of proceeding 
determines which factual propositions he or she will attempt to prove and 
must marshal evidence in support of his or her contentions.97 Any dedicated 
prosecutor, being human, will endeavour to win his or her cases.98 However, 
"the very essence of the function of the prosecutor is not to obtain a conviction 
at all cost, but rather to prosecute the case objectively with what appears to 
be essential and credible evidence and to challenge any evidence presented 
by the defence, with a view to discrediting such, in order to obtain a 
conviction."99 De Villiers100 notes that "[t]he criminal process is not a 
relentless pursuit to obtain a conviction. There are certain boundaries which 
the prosecution may not cross in order to obtain a conviction." While a 
prosecutor is not obliged to play chess against himself or herself and while it 
is not the prosecutor's function disinterestedly to place a hotchpotch of 
contradictory evidence before a court and then leave the court to make of it 
what it wills or to find its way through the maze, the prosecutor must act fairly 
in constructing and presenting the State's case with what appears to be 
credible evidence and in challenging the evidence of the accused and other 
defence witnesses.101 A prosecutor may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigour, and in so doing strike hard or telling blows; but he or she is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his or her duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one.102 Prosecutors may "not prosecute 
in single-minded pursuit of a conviction. They have a duty towards the 
accused to ensure that an innocent person is not convicted. In this regard 
they have a duty to disclose, in certain circumstances, facts harmful to their 
own case."103 Where the accused is legally represented and the prosecutor 
knows of evidence in favour of the accused or that may be destructive of the 
State's case, the prosecutor must disclose and make such evidence available 
to the defence.104 Where the accused is unrepresented, the prosecutor would 
be obliged to bring to the attention of the trial court information or evidence 
which is favourable to the accused or which points to his or her innocence or 
 
96 The Van Breda case para 50. 
97 Damaška 1973 U Pa L Rev 563. 
98 Swanepoel 2012 SACJ 120-121. 
99 Swanepoel 2012 SACJ 122, endorsing the Van der Westhuizen case para 11. 
100 De Villiers 2004 THRHR 73-74. 
101 The Van der Westhuizen case paras 11-12; the Prinsloo case paras 181-182. 
102 Berger v United States 295 US 78 (1935) 88. Also see the Van der Westhuizen case 
para 11; De Villiers 2010 THRHR 124. 
103 The Porritt case para 13. 
104 See, for example, the Van der Westhuizen case para 13; S v Masoka 2015 2 SACR 
268 (ECP) para 12 (hereafter the Masoka case); R v Filanius 1916 TPD 415 417-418 
(hereafter the Filanius case); Part 6 of the Prosecution Policy. 
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may be to his or her advantage.105 Moreover, where the accused is 
unrepresented and a material discrepancy arises between the testimony of a 
State witness and that witness' prior police statement, the prosecutor "must 
forthwith disclose the discrepancy to the court."106 It goes without saying that 
the suppression by the prosecutor of exculpatory evidence or evidence 
materially favourable to the accused "would seriously impede the search for 
truth."107 The prosecutor thus has a constitutional and ethical duty to disclose 
evidence supporting the accused's case that has the potential to illuminate 
the truth.108 The prosecutor is required to play fairly in the sense that he or 
she cannot hide the truth if it is known to be favourable to the accused.109 
This is underpinned by the trite principle that all material must be placed 
before the court necessary for the investigation of the truth of the matter.110 
The concealing of material exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor would 
deny an accused a fair trial and seriously undermine the proper 
administration of justice.111 
Of course, the role of the prosecutor is not to prosecute the State's case and 
also to defend the accused, but any prosecution must be done in an even-
handed, open and honest manner, always recognising an accused's right to 
a fair trial.112 "Clearly the prosecutor's role involves a duty to be fair to the 
accused in the administration of criminal justice."113 A case should be firmly 
but fairly and objectively prosecuted.114 Prosecutions must be fair and must 
not violate the accused's right to a fair trial.115 Ultimately, the prosecutor 
 
105 See, for example, the Masoka case para 12; S v Mayiya 1997 3 BCLR 386 (C) 394G-
J; S v Van Rensburg 1963 2 SA 343 (N) 343F; Steytler Undefended Accused on Trial 
136-137. 
106 S v Xaba 1983 3 SA 717 (A) 730B. Also see S v Naude 2005 2 SACR 218 (W) 222g-
j (hereafter the Naude case), pertaining to a similar duty which rests on the State even 
where the accused is defended, but where the defence counsel despite docket 
disclosure does not deal with a material discrepancy in cross-examination. However, 
with docket disclosure it would generally be left to the defence counsel to cross-
examine a State witness on a material inconsistency between the witness' viva voce 
evidence and a previous statement, so as to discredit the witness. 
107 Gershman 2001 Geo J Legal Ethics 328. 
108 Gershman 2001 Geo J Legal Ethics 328. 
109 Goodpaster 1987 J Crim L & Criminology 136. 
110 The Filanius case 417. 
111 See, for example, the Naude case. 
112 The Masoka case para 13; Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-40; De Villiers 
2010 THRHR 129, noting that prosecutors must reconcile the responsibility of 
protecting the public interest and at the same time protecting the rights of the accused. 
113 Gourlie 1982 Man LJ 37. 
114 Paragraph D(e) of the Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA; ss 4.2(e) and 4.3 of 
the IAP Standards of Professional Responsibility. 
115 The Tshotshoza case para 18. 
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stands in a special relation to the court: he or she must assist the court in 
ascertaining the truth.116 The prosecutor has a fundamental duty to truth.117 
For present purposes, the question arises what the import of the above 
analysis is for the function and duties of a prosecutor in an adversarial trial in 
the context of adverse pre-trial publicity. Where there may be enhanced 
pressure on a prosecutor to obtain a conviction in a notorious case that has 
attracted negative or virulent media attention,118 the prosecutor may not allow 
himself or herself to be influenced by such to the prejudice of the accused by, 
for example, suppressing exculpatory evidence or foisting his or her opinion 
in the matter upon the Court or seeking to introduce tainted or unlawfully or 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the admission of which would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, but must remain committed to his or 
her duty, in the words of Glanville Williams,119 "to bring the facts before the 
court" fairly. The prosecutor must remain faithful to his or her duty to ensure 
that the truth ultimately emerges at trial and that justice prevails. The 
prosecutor must, so to speak, look after the facts despite the negative 
publicity which a case generates and seek to protect the integrity of the 
proceedings. Throughout the course of the trial, the prosecutor may not act 
beyond what is indicated by the evidence.120 
One commentator cautions that where pressure is brought to bear on a 
prosecutor in a heinous case, or a case involving a well-known person, with 
added media attention, "the prosecutor must be careful not to institute 
charges [which otherwise may be a generally popular move] or permit the 
continuation of a criminal case in the absence of admissible evidence 
sufficient for a conviction."121 "[T]he prosecutor is forbidden from making 
these decisions based upon any personal or political consequences that 
might be involved, especially in cases that have attracted a great deal of 
publicity."122 And the prosecutor is both legally and ethically bound to turn 
over evidence helpful to the accused.123 Prosecutors in high-profile cases 
"must balance many important but often-competing interests when carrying 
 
116 S v Jija 1991 2 SA 52 (E) 68A. 
117 For an instructive discussion on this aspect, see Gershman 2001 Geo J Legal Ethics 
309. 
118 In Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 21, it is observed that "[w]hen a particularly 
heinous crime is committed, or a well-known person is suspected, the added media 
attention can visit incredible pressure upon the prosecutor." 
119 Williams Proof of Guilt 30. 
120 Section 4.2(e) of the IAP Standards of Professional Responsibility. 
121 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 21. 
122 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 21. 
123 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 21. 
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out their duties."124 The pressure of intense publicity taxes the resources and 
tests the abilities of prosecutors to remain focussed upon the true goal in any 
criminal case – to serve the public with the utmost integrity, and to ensure 
that a just result is obtained.125 Ultimately for prosecutors, success is not to 
be measured by convictions, but when the results are just, thus requiring the 
highest standards of conduct of any professional advocate.126 
No matter how much pressure is put on the prosecutor due to the 
reprehensible nature of the crime, the surrounding publicity, or the parties 
involved, the prosecutor must retain his or her independence and 
objectivity.
127
 Political, personal and private considerations must be set aside 
in all decisions taken by the prosecutor in dealing with a case.128 A prosecutor 
must act with objectivity and protect the public interest and "must purposefully 
take all reasonable steps to ensure maximum compliance with constitutional 
obligations, even under difficult circumstances."129 
William Lee Hon,130 who is a prosecutor in the United States of America, also 
points out that besides pressure emanating from law enforcement officials 
and/or victims or their families who may have strong opinions or feelings 
about how a case should turn out, it is not infrequent to find pressure 
emanating from public opinion as expressed in the media which may be very 
much in favour of a particular outcome. Hon131 notes that public sentiment in 
the media may often unfortunately be based on inadequate or unreliable 
facts, and that due to ethical constraints there is not much that prosecutors 
can do to change or counter such public opinion. Hon132 explains that "[a]s 
long as the prosecutor and public are on the same page and the prosecutor 
has the wind at his back, there's not much of a problem here - but what 
happens when the prosecutor's obligation to see that justice is done conflicts 
with the prevailing public sentiment?" 
Hon133 refers to a prime example in the United States of America, where a 
prosecutor apparently allowed himself to make decisions based upon the 
intensity of the media attention surrounding a pending rape case rather than 
 
124 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 22. 
125 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 22. 
126 Wallace 2004-2005 Delaware Lawyer 21. 
127 See, for example, Gourlie 1982 Man LJ 37-38. 
128 Gourlie 1982 Man LJ 37. 
129 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-40, citing S v Jaipal 2005 1 SACR 215 (CC) 
para 56 and the Carmichele case paras 72-73. 
130 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. 
131 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. 
132 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. 
133 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. 
DWM BROUGHTON  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)                                      18 
on an overriding sense of fairness or objectivity where there was no case. 
The charges were later dropped by the Attorney-General. As another writer 
points out, the media initially depicted the case as a sordid tale of spoilt, white 
student-athletes from an elite university who took advantage of an 
impoverished and troubled black woman, and that in essence the prosecutor 
positioned himself in the media as the knight in shining armour determined to 
ride roughshod over the accused in order to right a grievous injustice.134 The 
prosecutor made several improper public statements to the media during the 
pre-trial phase where he cast the prospective accused in a poor light. The 
prosecutor moreover went so far as to fail to disclose exculpatory DNA 
evidence to the defence and he made other mistakes regarding the discovery 
process.135 What ultimately emerged from that situation is that the prosecutor 
concerned was removed from office and disbarred.136 
Hon137 correctly comments that: 
At the end of the day, the prosecutor has to be able to step back from the 
spotlight and cameras and make very important decisions based upon credible 
evidence and not what people who have less than the entire picture expect. 
Never has that old adage 'to thine own self be true' been more meaningful than 
for the prosecutor who has to handle a high-profile, high-publicity case. 
The prosecutor in the adversarial (accusatorial) system can moreover play a 
vital and pivotal role in safeguarding the fairness of an accused's trial in the 
face of unfavourable or hostile pre-trial publicity, particularly insofar as the 
impartial adjudication of the case by the trial court is concerned. The 
prosecutor can do this by means of (i) the opening address,138 (ii) party 
control of litigation, and (iii) closing argument on the merits, before judgment. 
In all these respects the prosecutor can focus the court's mind on the issues 
to be determined at trial and the evidence which the parties determine the 
court should hear, rather than pre-trial publicity which is detrimental to the 
accused, thereby making it less likely or reducing the risk that the court's 
decision would be based in any way on such publicity.139 
Whereas in adversarial process it is the prosecutor and the accused who 
shape the issues at trial and gather and present the evidence, which the court 
 
134 Medwed 2010 Cardozo L Rev 2193. 
135 Medwed 2010 Cardozo L Rev 2193-2195. 
136 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. 
137 Hon 2012 http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure (emphasis 
added). 
138 In the South African legal system, in terms of s 150(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977. 
139 Broughton 2019 THRHR 226, 228; Broughton Analysis of Pre-trial Publicity 229-232, 
349-353; the Banana case 38G-H. 
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is then primarily reliant on and indeed bound by in reaching its verdict, there 
is little opportunity for the presiding judicial officer to pursue his or her own 
agenda or to act on his or her biases.140 Because the presiding officer seldom 
takes the lead in conducting the proceedings (in contradistinction to his or her 
counterpart in inquisitorial systems), he or she is unlikely to appear to be 
partisan or to become embroiled in the contest. His or her detachment 
preserves the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.141 Advocacy 
in the accusatorial process "has the potential to keep judicial idiosyncrasies 
in check" and is an important controlling mechanism of the judicial 
authority.142 There are several key and interrelated ways in which the 
adversarial (accusatorial) process may engender, promote or enhance 
judicial impartiality in the adjudication process when a court is confronted with 
adverse pre-trial publicity.143 It is, for instance, "in the nature of the 
accusatorial process that judicial officers should play a [relatively] passive 
role and be aloof from the proceedings. This serves to enhance the principle 
of impartiality."144 The adversarial process creates a presumption of 
impartiality.145 
The right to a fair trial in these circumstances may also be promoted or 
enhanced when the prosecutor consults with the State witnesses in preparing 
for trial. The prosecutor can caution the witnesses that their evidence is solely 
to be based on their own observations and not in any way on pre-trial 
publicity. Cross-examination, which plays a pivotal role in the adversarial 
nature of criminal proceedings, would moreover be an effective means to 
point to specific instances of tainted testimony on account of pre-trial 
publicity.146 
5 Prosecutorial impartiality compared with judicial 
impartiality 
The role of prosecutors in a criminal trial cannot be equated with that of 
magistrates or judges. Their duties, functions and responsibilities are 
 
140 See Landsman Adversary System 44. Also see the more ample discussion on this 
score in Broughton 2019a THRHR 225-228; Broughton Analysis of Pre-trial Publicity 
229-232. 
141 Landsman Adversary System 44-45. 
142 Roodt 2004 Fundamina 139; Labuschagne 1993 De Jure 356 (emphasis added). 
143 Broughton 2019b THRHR 367-380; Broughton Analysis of Pre-trial Publicity 199-232, 
487-492, 497, 534-540. 
144 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe "Judicial Notice" 515 (para 27 1) (footnote omitted). 
145 Labuschagne 1993 De Jure 356. 
146 The Van Breda case para 55. 
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different.147 The judiciary is held to the highest standards of independence 
and impartiality because judges are the decision-makers in an adversarial 
judicial system. Prosecutors neither make the final decision on whether to 
acquit or convict, nor on whether evidence is admissible or not. Their function 
is to place before a court what the prosecution considers to be credible 
evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.148 The presiding officer is 
the arbiter of the guilt or innocence of the accused and is the ultimate 
repository of the fairness of the trial.149 The presiding officer must keep an 
open mind throughout the proceedings until judgment. He or she is not 
permitted to form an early opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused.150 It is inevitable that the prosecutor, on the other hand, will form an 
early opinion as to the guilt of the accused to found the institution of criminal 
proceedings, upon studying the case docket, and thus to entertain a natural 
bias or predisposition towards the guilt of the accused. The hypothesis that 
would invariably be entertained by the prosecution when taking a criminal 
case to trial is that the accused is guilty. "Prosecutors usually approach 
criminal prosecutions with a view, sometimes a very strong view, that 
accused persons are guilty", which is permissible, subject to the caveat that 
they must not prosecute in single-minded pursuit of a conviction.151 The 
presiding judicial officer, however, may not prejudge the issues to be decided, 
as this would constitute clear impugnable bias.152 
In an adversarial trial it is inevitable that the prosecutor, in conducting the 
prosecution on behalf of the State, will be partisan, and thus he or she will 
invariably be perceived as biased.153 It is virtually inconceivable that an 
accused in a criminal case would ever hold the view that a prosecutor is 
objective and impartial, given that it is the prosecutor who reads the case 
docket, compiles the charge sheet and ultimately prosecutes the accused.154 
Whilst the prosecutor must not conduct himself or herself so as, in the eyes 
of the accused, to project a malign character, the prosecutor is nevertheless 
under the adversarial system not required to impress himself or herself upon 
 
147 The Porritt case paras 11, 21. 
148 The Porritt case para 11. 
149 R v Sole 2001 12 BCLR 1305 (Les) 1342B-C (hereafter the Sole case); S v Du Toit 
(2) 2004 1 SACR 47 (T) 65b (hereafter the Du Toit case). 
150 The Sole case 1330I-J. 
151 The Porritt case para 13; the Sole case 1330H-1331D; Zupančič 1982 J Contemp L 
68-69. 
152 Devenish 2000 TSAR 402, 403-404; De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 
7 BCLR 916 (C) para 17. 
153 The Porritt case para 13. 
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13. Also see De Villiers 2010 THRHR 128. 
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an accused as a "benign influence".155 The notion of a "neutral prosecutor" at 
trial is a fiction.156 In Marshall v Jerrico Inc. the United States Supreme Court 
held that "[p]rosecutors need not be entirely 'neutral and detached'… In an 
adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their 
enforcement of the law".157 A prosecutor "cannot realistically remain a neutral 
agent of justice above the adversary fray."158 In the circumstances, the so-
called "quasi-judicial" role of prosecutors should not be overplayed.159 As one 
commentator aptly remarks, "[d]espite the prosecutor's duty to seek justice, 
the prosecutor is still an advocate in an adversary system."160 
As noted above, prosecutorial impartiality does not mean not acting 
adversarially, but acting fairly or even-handedly, i.e. avoiding 
discrimination.161 In a criminal prosecution the State is in the nature of the 
case a party with a substantial interest in the matter, which endeavours to 
prove the guilt of the accused ("By 'n strafvervolging is die Staat uit die aard 
van die saak 'n party met 'n wesenlike belang by die geding wat poog om die 
beskuldigde se skuld te bewys.")162 The presiding officer, on the other hand, 
must keep the scales even in the contest between the prosecution and the 
accused. The morphology of the South African accusatory trial is "of a 
triangular nature, with judges holding the scales of justice at the pinnacle and 
the prosecutors facing the accused to ensure justice in the public interest."163 
In all the premises, it is submitted that any additional knowledge and 
understanding of the facts of a case which a prosecutor may derive from 
adverse pre-trial publicity or judicial pronouncements on the facts contained 
in an earlier civil judgment or parallel proceedings or a judicial commission of 
inquiry cannot per se amount to prosecutorial bias that would result in trial 
prejudice.164 After all, "unfairness for trial purposes cannot be inferred from 
 
155 The Sole case 1332G-H. 
156 Harris 1995 Neb L Rev 816. 
157 Marshall v Jerrico Inc 446 US 238 (1980) 248, as endorsed in the Porritt case para 
15. 
158 Harris 1995 Neb L Rev 816. Also see Green and Zacharias 2004 Wis L Rev 898-899. 
159 Uviller 1973 Mich L Rev 1159. Also see the discussion in Woolley 2017 Can B Rev 
795 et seq. 
160 Lee 1994 UCLA L Rev 171. 
161 The Van der Westhuizen case para 9. 
162 In re Mjoli 1994 1 SACR 336 (T) 343g-h. 
163 Wolf 2011 TSAR 712. 
164 See the apposite findings in S v Shaik 2008 1 SACR 1 (CC) paras 65-68 (hereafter 
the Shaik case), in the context of additional knowledge of the case which the 
prosecutor obtained in an investigatory position, that is, information which would not 
otherwise have been available to the prosecutor by virtue of his capacity as prosecutor 
to whom in the normal course the police would have made available the evidence of 
the case in the case docket. Also see Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape 
v Killian 2008 1 SACR 247 (SCA) (hereafter the Killian case); and the Sole case. 
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the mere fact that the prosecutor is partisan and holds a strong view that the 
accused is guilty."165 Rather, what one would look for, as borne out by the 
case-law, to establish prejudicial bias on the part of the prosecutor is, for 
example, where he or she wages a personal vendetta, impairs the conduct 
of the proceedings and the dignity of the court, or uses the same office as the 
trial judge's assessors,166 or where he or she launches a prosecution upon 
patently insufficient evidence or where, even though a prima facie case 
clearly exists, the prosecutor is nonetheless not content simply to do his or 
her duty and lead his or her case, but seeks to influence and to foist his or 
her opinion in the matter upon the trial court. While a prosecutor may 
inevitably entertain a natural bias towards the guilt of an accused, he or she 
crosses that invisible line when prejudice arises.167 
6 South African case studies 
Adverse pre-trial publicity would be difficult to curb or limit given the modern 
phenomenon of a rapid dissemination of news across a broad spectrum of 
media, including social media. It is for this reason that Moseneke,168 in an 
extra-curial address, observed that the sub judice rule (i.e. the rule which 
prohibits statements that give rise to a demonstrable, real and substantial risk 
of prejudice to the administration of justice in pending court proceedings)169 
is "nearly impossible to hold and to keep" ("near impossible for the courts to 
police the rule"), and indeed, is "on the verge of extinction." This is all the 
more so in the light of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the landmark Midi 
Television case having significantly narrowed the scope or test for sub judice 
contempt of court ex facie curiae (beyond the face of the court) and related 
pre-trial publication bans – that is to say, from one of statements that tend to 
prejudice the administration of justice to one of statements that give rise to a 
demonstrable, real and substantial risk of prejudice occurring to the 
administration of justice.170 As there is not in general an a priori answer to the 
question of whether a criminal trial will be fair or not,171 it is submitted that it 
would be difficult to establish that there is a real and substantial risk that a 
 
165 Van der Merwe "Prosecuting Authority" 1-68, with reference to the Porritt case. 
166 See the Shaik case para 66; the Killian case para 25. 
167 The Sole case 1331C-D. 
168 Moseneke 2015 https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dcj-dikgang-moseneke-the-
media-courts-and-technology-remarks-on-the-media-coverage-of-the-oscar-
pistorius-trial-and-open-justice/. 
169 The test for sub judice contempt of court ex facie curiae and related pre-trial 
publication bans, as enunciated in the Midi Television case para 19. 
170 Moseneke 2015 https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dcj-dikgang-moseneke-the-
media-courts-and-technology-remarks-on-the-media-coverage-of-the-oscar-
pistorius-trial-and-open-justice/. 
171 National Director of Public Prosecutions v King 2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA) para 4. 
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statement or publication would prejudice the administration of justice in 
pending proceedings - in other words, that there is a real and substantial risk 
that a publication would lead to an unfair trial. Such a submission is reinforced 
by the fact that there is a developed system of procedural or judicial 
safeguards that has evolved to prevent the contingency of adverse pre-trial 
publicity impinging upon the accused's right to a fair trial, especially the 
impartial adjudication of the case.172 
How, then, have prosecutors in South Africa fared in handling prosecutions 
in the face of adverse pre-trial publicity? A few notable high-profile matters 
may be referred to. In the Oscar Pistorius case,173 in respect of which I was 
a member of the prosecuting team on all appellate and sentencing afresh 
proceedings, the prosecutors remained dedicated to the evidence and facts 
of the case in seeking to have corrected on appeal the miscarriage of justice 
on both the initial conviction for culpable homicide and the sentence of six 
years' imprisonment imposed on the murder conviction substituted for the 
culpable homicide conviction. There is no evidence that the prosecutors were 
at any stage unduly influenced in the handling of the trial and appellate 
proceedings by pre-trial publicity that was adverse to Pistorius. 
In the Prinsloo case (otherwise known as the so-called Krion case), which at 
the time was the largest Ponzi-scheme case to have been prosecuted in 
South Africa, one of the accused brought a pre-trial motion wherein he 
applied for a stay of prosecution predicated on adverse findings that were 
made against the accused in earlier reported civil judgments arising from 
substantially the same facts.174 It was averred by the accused that such 
findings would bias the trial court in the criminal matter. The Court which 
heard the pre-trial motion, per Ngoepe JP, rejected this contention and 
accordingly dismissed the application. Ngoepe JP inter alia held and affirmed 
as follows in this respect:175 
The application was vehemently opposed by the State. It has always been 
without merit. In effect, what the applicant is contending is that, once a civil case 
has been decided and certain findings made, a criminal prosecution in respect 
of the same conduct should not be allowed to proceed, as the accused would 
be prejudiced by the prior civil court judgment against the accused (defendant). 
 
172 See the Banana case; Broughton 2019a THRHR 213; Broughton 2019b THRHR 363. 
For a detailed discussion on the aspect of procedural safeguards in the face of adverse 
pre-trial publicity, see Broughton Analysis of Pre-trial Publicity. 
173 See Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius 2016 1 SACR 431 (SCA); 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius 2018 1 SACR 115 (SCA). 
174 See the Pelser case. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Broughton Analysis 
of Pre-trial Publicity. 
175 The Pelser case paras 8-9. 
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The premise of the application is that the trial judge would be influenced by the 
pronouncements in the various civil cases referred to above, and therefore fail 
to adjudicate in the criminal trial objectively, with an open mind and with the 
necessary impartiality. There is no basis for this. It is trite law that decisions by 
the one court are not binding on the other court; they are mere opinions; this is 
particularly so with regard to factual findings as in casu. Secondly, the standard 
of proof in criminal trials is higher than in civil trials. The applicant's submission 
could lead to absurdities. Not only would an accused person be absolved from 
criminal prosecution once a civil judgment has been handed down against 
him/her in respect of the same conduct, but the reverse would also have to 
occur: once a criminal conviction has been made against an accused person in 
respect of particular conduct, a subsequent civil trial in respect of the same 
conduct could likewise be deemed to be unfair to the accused (defendant) as a 
result of the perceived influence of the criminal verdict. This argument would 
make nonsense of the well-established principle of our law that conduct can 
give rise to both civil and criminal liability, both of which are prosecutable against 
the perpetrator. Furthermore, the criminal trial is of course going to be heard by 
a judge, the indictment having been served already. 
'A Judge is a trained judicial officer and he knows that he must decide every 
case which comes before him on the evidence adduced in that case. He knows 
further that a decision on facts in one case is irrelevant in respect of any other 
case, and that he must confine himself to the evidence produced in the case he 
is actually trying.' 
The trial judge would also be aware that the State would still have to prove the 
facts required for the criminal conviction, despite the judgments in the civil 
matters. 
The applicant in the Krion case moreover averred that the prosecutors 
handling the criminal trial would also be unduly influenced by the parallel civil 
findings or pronouncements in question. I handled the pre-trial motion on 
behalf of the State and was also a member of the prosecuting team that 
conducted the Krion trial. I was furthermore a member of the State team 
which handled the appeal against conviction and sentence in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.176 At no stage were the prosecutors actuated by the prior 
adverse civil findings or pronouncements in the conduct of the criminal trial 
and appeal. 
In the recent case of S v Oosthuizen (otherwise known as the so-called Coffin 
case),177 the accused were convicted inter alia of assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm and kidnapping for placing a man inside a coffin and 
threatening to set him alight or threatening to put a snake inside the coffin. A 
video recording of the incident made by the accused went viral on various 
social media platforms before trial. This provoked a huge uproar from the 
public. The accused were initially charged with and convicted of attempted 
 
176 See the Prinsloo case. 
177 S v Oosthuizen 2019 ZASCA 182 (2 December 2019). 
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murder for the incident, but this conviction was set aside on appeal. From the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment it is evident that no evidence had been 
presented to support a charge of attempted murder. It remains unclear on 
what basis the prosecutor preferred this charge against the accused. This 
case perhaps illustrates the point that prosecutors need to exercise greater 
caution in handling high-profile criminal cases that generate virulent publicity 
ahead of trial. 
7 Conclusion 
Pre-trial publicity is an unavoidable by-product of the criminal justice system 
in an open and democratic society, especially insofar as high-profile or 
notorious cases are concerned in the modern era of a rapid dissemination of 
news across various media platforms, including social media. Publicity in 
advance of a criminal trial may also be in the form of published judicial 
findings in a parallel civil case or commission of inquiry or other parallel 
proceedings, or evidence presented in a parallel matter which is reported on 
or is readily available in the public domain. Such publicity may be adverse to 
an accused or effectively amount to a prejudgment of the issues to be 
determined in the criminal trial. A trial by media can be pernicious, especially 
with sensationalised or fake news or disinformation. 
Media attention which a criminal case generates may visit enhanced pressure 
upon the prosecutor especially to obtain a conviction. The prosecutor, 
however, may not allow himself or herself to be influenced or swayed by 
unfavourable or hostile surrounding publicity and in the process ride 
roughshod over the right of the accused to a fair trial and the proper 
administration of justice in order to "right" what he or she perceives to be a 
grievous injustice committed by the accused, which has attracted public 
outrage as expressed in the media. A prosecutor may not buckle under media 
or partisan interests and concerns, however vociferously these may be 
presented. In exercising the charging discretion and conducting a criminal 
prosecution in court, the prosecutor at all times must act independently of the 
media and with objectivity, devoting himself or herself to the facts of the case 
as they emerge from the evidence to be proved. The prosecutor must at all 
times be conscious of the fact that he or she has a fundamental duty to truth 
and must assist the trial court in ascertaining the truth fairly. 
All the same, the prosecutor is not in the same position as the presiding 
judicial officer. He or she would be partisan at trial and entertain a natural 
bias towards the guilt of the accused, which he or she would be seeking to 
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prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, exposure of the prosecutor to 
adverse pre-trial publicity would not per se result in trial-related prejudice. 
In an adversarial system, the prosecutor can play a pivotal role in promoting 
or enhancing judicial impartiality in the adjudication of a case in the face of 
adverse surrounding publicity, and in focusing the trial court's mind on the 
evidence rather than on such publicity, thereby reducing the risk that the 
court's decision would be based in any way on publicity of this kind. 
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